Given a checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution, the \No Z-Cycle" property (N ZC) states that there does not exist a dependency between a checkpoint and itself. In other words, there does not exist a non-causal sequence of messages that starts after a checkpoint and terminates before that checkpoint. From an operational point of view, that property corresponds to the fact that each checkpoint belongs to at least one consistent global checkpoint. So it could be used, for example, for restarting a distributed application after the occurrence of a failure. In this paper we derive a characterization of the N ZC property (previously an open problem). It identi es a subset of Z-cycles, namely Core Z-Cycles (CZCs), that has to be empty in a distributed execution so that the execution satis es the N ZC property. Then, we present a communication-induced checkpointing protocol that prevents CZCs on-they. This protocol actually removes from the execution checkpoint and communication patterns whose structure is the common causal part to any CZC. Finally we propose a taxonomy of communication-induced checkpointing protocols that ensure the N ZC property in a distributed execution.
Due to the presence of non-causal Z-paths, a message chain could start after a checkpoint and terminate before that checkpoint. In that case a dependency relation is established between a checkpoint and itself. This pattern has been formalized by Netzer property (N ZC) if it contains no Z-cycle. NZC has a noteworthy feature: \a checkpoint which is involved in no Z-cycle belongs at least to one consistent global checkpoint". A global checkpoint of a distributed execution is a collection of local checkpoints one for each process. A global checkpoint is consistent 4] if, for any pair of its checkpoints, no one happens-before ( 13] ) another. As a consequence the NZC property has applications in many dependability problems such as determination of distributed breakpoints 8], determination of shared global states of a distributed execution 9] and rollback-recovery 6], just to name the most important. As an example, in the context of rollbackrecovery, ensuring the NZC property means rollback without the risk of domino e ect 18] 1 and simple and e cient solutions for the recovery line computation and the garbage collection problem 6] 2 .
As rst contribution, this paper introduces a characterization of the NZC property. This result has been obtained thanks to the introduction of concatenation relations on message chains and checkpoints that allow to express, in an easy way, the basic structure of checkpoint and communication patterns.
The characterization is based on a property which stipulates that there is no Core Z-Cycle (CZC) 3 in the checkpoint and communication pattern of the execution (N CZC property). A core Z-cycle is a Z-cycle with several constraints on its structure. We prove that NZC , NCZC. This result is obtained by introducing successive embedded subsets of Z-cycles, namely, prime Z-cycles, and core Z-cycles, whose members satisfy progressively stronger constraints on their checkpoint and communication pattern structure.
The previous characterization is important not only from a theoretical point of view but, also, from a practical one as we can derive checkpointing protocols that ensure on-the-y the NZC
property. In particular we introduce a family of communication-induced checkpointing protocols (F NZC ) based on the following basic hypothesis: (1) the usable knowledge of the execution at a certain event can not be more than the one included in the causal past of that event, (2) the execution is asynchronous i.e., no bound exists on the process' speed and on the message transfer delay. Basing on these hypothesis Z-cycles cannot be tracked on-the-y as they are non-causal in nature. A protocol that prevents the formation of a particular checkpoint and communication pattern, namely Suspect Core Z-Cycle (SCZC) is proposed. The SCZC pattern represents the causal part of any core Z-cycle. As it is causal, it is on-the-y trackable by a protocol belonging to F NZC .
The prevention of SCZC patterns is done by exploiting the control information piggybacked on the incoming messages and the local history of a process. Essentially, we assume each process P i selects some local states to be local checkpoints (basic checkpoints) then, upon the delivery of a message m, a process P i is directed to take a forced checkpoint if message m is \closing" an SCZC pattern. The proposed protocol piggybacks on each application message a matrix (n n) of integers where n represents the number of processes of the execution.
Recently Helary et al. 10] have shown that ensuring NZC is a particular application of the Virtual-Precedence property (VP), de ned on an interval based abstraction of a distributed execution. If the abstraction satis es VP, then it is possible to associate a timestamping function on intervals such that: intervals which are connected by a message are timestamped in a non-decreasing way (safety part) and the timestamp of a process increases after communication (liveness part). In the checkpointing problem, intervals of the abstraction correspond to checkpoint intervals and, the abstraction of the distributed execution corresponds to a checkpoint and communication pattern.
storage all checkpoints related to events that occurred before the last computed recovery line.
In this context it has been shown that VP , NZC 10] . From the previous equivalence, it comes out that one can ensure NZC either by using a particular timestamping function that satis es VP or by preventing the formation of particular checkpoint and communication patterns necessary to form a Z-cycle. Informally, the former method ensures NZC \passing through" VP while the second ensures VP \passing through" NZC.
Basing on previous observation, we propose, as last contribution of this paper, a taxonomy of communication-induced checkpointing protocols in F NZC that splits them into two classes according to the way the \see" the equivalence between VP and NZC, namely VP-enforced and VP-accordant protocols. A VP-enforced protocol assumes the existence of a timestamping function that labels checkpoint intervals. A forced checkpoint is taken each time either safety or liveness of the function is going to be violated. A VP-accordant protocol does not use a timestamping function but prevents the formation of particular checkpoint and communication patterns in the execution. As a consequence, the protocol proposed in this paper belongs to this class. To the best of our knowledge this is the rst taxonomy that splits communication-induced protocols according to a homogeneous criterion, namely, the equivalence between VP and NZC.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the model of the distributed execution. The notion of message chain and the concept of Z-cycle are formally introduced in Section 3. In the same section we introduce two concatenation relations that will be used to express the structure of checkpoint and communication patterns. In Section 4 the CZC is introduced, and the result NZC , NCZC is proved. Section 5 presents the communication-induced checkpointing protocol derived from the previous characterization. In the nal section we discuss the relation between the NZC property and the Virtual Precedence (VP) property introduced by Helary et al. in 10] , and we present the taxonomy of checkpointing protocols in F NZC .
The Model of a Distributed Execution
We assume a distributed execution consisting of a set P of n processes fP 1 ; P 2 ; : : : ; P n g. Processes do not share memory and do not share a common clock value. They communicate only by exchanging messages. Each pair of processes is connected by an asynchronous, reliable, directed logical channel. Transmission delays over channels are unpredictable but nite.
A process produces a sequence of events; each event moves the process from one local state to
another. The h-th event in process P i is denoted as e i;h . We assume events are produced by the execution of internal, send or deliver statements. The send and deliver events of a message m are denoted respectively by send(m) and deliver(m).
De nition 2.1
In process P i an event e i;h precedes an event e i;k , denoted e i;h P e i;k , if, and only if, h < k.
De nition 2.2
An event e i;h of process P i precedes an event e j;k of process P j due to message m, denoted e i;h m e j;k , if, and only if: (e i;h = send(m))^(e j;k = deliver(m))
Lamport's Happened-Before relation 13], denoted as e !, is the transitive closure of the union of relations P and m . Let H be the set of all events produced by a distributed execution, the execution can be modeled by the partial order b H = (H; e !).
A local state of a process saved on stable storage is called a local checkpoint of the process. A local state is not necessarily recorded as a local checkpoint, so the set of local checkpoints is a subset of the set of local states.
The x-th checkpoint of process P i is denoted as C i;x where x is called the rank of the checkpoint.
The rank of checkpoints of a process increases monotonically: each time a checkpoint is taken the rank is increased by one. We assume that each process P i takes an initial checkpoint C i;1 (corresponding to the initial state of the process) and that after each event a checkpoint will eventually be taken. A checkpoint interval I i;x is the set of events between C i;x and C i;x+1 . Among 
Background Theory and Preliminary De nitions
This section introduces the notions of causal and non-causal message chain and two concatenation relations which are used to express the causal, or non-causal, combination of checkpoints and/or chains of messages. Finally, the concept of Z-cycle is reformulated using the concatenation relations. As an example, in Figure 1 .b we have a message chain formed by messages m 1 ; m 2 ]. A particular case of message chain is the causal message chain, in which the deliver event of a message always precedes on a process the send event of the successive message of the chain. 
Message Chains

Concatenation Relations
Causal Concatenation Relation. The causal concatenation relation, denoted by the symbol , expresses the causal combination of two objects (an object can be either a checkpoint or a message chain). It is de ned as follows:
De nition 3. (deliver( :last) 2 I k;y )^(send( 0 :first) 2 I k;y )^(send( 0 :first) P deliver( :last))
As an example, the non-causal concatenation 00 i;x 0 is shown in Figure 2 . Whenever not necessary the pair of indices is dropped from the non-causal relation. This property allows to use concatenation relations applied to message chains also as concatenation operators generating message chains. For the previous example, the generated message chain is = 0 (or, in case of non-causal concatenation, = 0 ).
Z-Cycles and the No-Z-Cycle Property
By using previous notations, we express the notion of Z-Cycle (ZC) introduced by Netzer 
Prime Z-Cycles
This paragraph introduces the notion of Prime Z-Cycle (PZC). It is interesting because of the result in Lemma 4.2 which states that if there is a Z-cycle in a checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution then there exists in that checkpoint and communication pattern a PZC whose size of its chain is smaller than, or equal to, the one of the original Z-cycle.
Given a pair (C i;x ; P k ), let us consider the set of causal chains starting after C i;x whose recipient of :last is P k denoted M(C i;x ; P k ). This set is partially ordered by the relation: 0 , deliver( :last) P deliver( 0 :last) Let min(M(C i;x ; P k )) denote the set of the minimum elements in M(C i;x ; P k ) ( 4 ). This set contains causal chains starting after C i;x and sharing the last message. By using these notions the concept of Prime Z-Cycle (PZC) is introduced as follows:
De nition 4.1 (Prime Z-cycle) ZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; ) is a PZC, denoted PZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; ), if, and only if, 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k )). 2 if 6 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k )) then let us consider 0 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k )) (note that 0 exists as M(C i;x ; P k ) is not empty since it contains ).
There are two cases: Previous lemma says that if a checkpoint is involved in an Z-cycle whose chain has size one, then there exists a PZC involving the same checkpoint. The following lemma extends the previous result to a chain of any size:
If there exists ZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; ) then there exists PZC(C i;x ; 0 ; I l;z ; 0 ) with j 0 j j j.
Proof
Let us consider ZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; ). We have two alternatives:
1 if j j = 1 then the claim follows from Lemma 4.1; 2 if j j > 1 then if 0 = 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k )) then the claim trivially follows. Otherwise let us consider 0 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k )) (note that 0 exists as M(C i;x ; P k ) is not empty since it contains ). There are two cases:
2.1 send( :first) e !deliver( 0 :last) (see Figure 7 .a).
In this case we get PZC(C i;x ; 0 ; I k;y ; ) and the claim follows;
2.2 deliver( 0 :last) e !send( :first) (see Figure 7 .b).
In this case, by construction, we get ZC(C i;x ; 0 00 ]; I h;w ; 0 ) where = 00 h;w 0 . Note that j 00 j 1 and j 0 j < j j (see Figure 7 .c).
If we fall in case 2.2, the previous construction can be repeated on ZC(C i;x ; 0 00 ]; I h;w ; 0 ) and after a nite number of steps either we fall in case 2.1 or we get ZC(C i;x ; b ; I l;z ; b ) with j b j = 1 thus the claim follows from Lemma 4.1. 
Core Z-Cycles
This paragraph introduces the notion of Core Z-Cycle (CZC). It is interesting because of the result in Lemma 4.4 which states that if there is a PZC involving a checkpoint then there exists a CZC that involves a checkpoint (not necessarily the same checkpoint involved in the PZC). A CZC is actually a PZC with a restriction on its structure. This restriction derives from the sequence of checkpoint intervals related to its message chain as it can be seen from the following de nition:
De nition 4.2 (Core Z-Cycle) Let consider PZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; ) and let S( ) be the sequence of checkpoint intervals associated to . That PZC is a Core Z-Cycle, denoted CZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; ) if, and only if: Let us now prove that if there exists a PZC in a checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution, then there exists a CZC in that pattern, assuming the size of the non-causal message chain of the PZC equal to one and then we generalize the result to a chain of any size:
:last :last C k;y P j C j;z P j C j;z+1 C j;z Let I j;z+1 be the rst checkpoint interval in S( ) satisfying the condition of Case 2.B. There exists at least one causal message chain starting after C j;z+1 and ending in I k;y or in a previous checkpoint interval of P k . Therefore, the set M(C j;z+1 ; P k ) is not empty.
Let us consider 0 2 min(M(C j;z+1 ; P k )); we have two cases:
2.B.1 send( :first) e !deliver( 0 :last) (see Figure 9 .a). We get ZC(C j;z+1 ; 0 ; I k;y ; ) where = ? b and send( b :first) 2 I j;z . From Lemma 4.2, there exists PZC(C j;z+1 ; ; I l;t ; ) with j j j j < j j; 2.B.2 deliver( 0 :last) e !send( :first) (see Figure 9 .b). We get ZC(C j;z+1 ; 0 00 ]; I b;s ; 0 ) where 00 b;s 0 = ? b and send( b :first) 2 I j;z , hence j 0 j < j j (see Figure 9 .c). By Lemma 4.2 there exists PZC(C j;z+1 ; ; I l;t ; ) with j j j 0 j. So we have j j < j j; In both cases we obtain a PZC with j j < j j.
If we fall in case 2.B, the previous construction can be applied on the obtained PZC. After a nite number of steps, either we fall in case 2.A or j j = 1 thus, by Lemma 4.3, we get a CZC. 
A Checkpointing Protocol Family F NZC
We assume to have a node consisting of three layers: application layer, checkpointing protocol layer and communication system layer. Each process is an instance of the checkpointing protocol source code. Messages arrive at processes from a communication system and they will be delivered to the application layer. The application layer generates events of sending of a message and of taking a checkpoint (basic checkpoints) to processes. Sending events are delivered to the communication system. A process takes either basic checkpoints or forced checkpoints. The latter ones are triggered by a predicate evaluated at the time a message is received from the communication system layer.
A checkpointing protocol belongs to F NZC if (i) it ensures that the nal checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution ( b H; C b H ) produced by that protocol satis es the NZC property and (ii) the protocol respects the following constraints:
C1. The usable knowledge at an event e is the restriction of ( b H; C b H ) to e's causal past (the causal past of an event e is the set H e fe 0 2 Hje 0 e !eg); C2. Upon the arrival of a message m at process P k , the protocol has to evaluate the predicate on-the-y (i.e., without additional delays). If it is evaluated to true, a forced checkpoint has to be taken before delivering m to the above layer;
C3. The evaluation of the predicate is based on the usable knowledge available at that event (i.e., the local context of the process plus the control information piggybacked on the application message). In other words, no \control" message is allowed; Given CZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; ), it can be broken by placing an additional local checkpoint of process P k taken between the send of :first and the delivery of :last as shown in Figure 10 .a. So for any protocol, the instant of time before the event deliver( :last) represents \the last opportunity" for taking an additional (forced) checkpoint in order to remove that CZC.
As a Z-cycle, a core Z-cycle is generally not trackable on-the-y at the last opportunity time by a protocol in F NZC . This is due to a key factor: the message chain could contain at least one non-causal concatenation (for example the message chain shown in Figure 10 .a contains two non-causal concatenations). In other words a CZC is trackable on-the-y at that time only if its chain is causal.
The previous argument shows that the best a protocol in F NZC can do to prevent the formation of core Z-cycles is to remove from the execution those checkpoint and communication patterns whose structure represents the common causal part of any core Z-cycle which is detectable by a process at the last opportunity time. The reader could now wonder if the SCZC is the right pattern to prevent in order to remove CZCs. In particular, why the SCZC structure includes only the last checkpoint interval passed through by (i.e., I j;z ) and not all the checkpoint intervals associated to the nal causal part of the non-causal message chain associated to a CZC. This causal part would represent the larger part of visible by P k at the last opportunity time.
Let MC be the set of message chains starting after C k;y , terminating before C i;x and sharing the last message :last. This de nes a set of PZCs X one for each distinct in MC. Let us assume the causal message chain 0 in Figure 11 does not exist. In such a case, at the last opportunity time P k cannot safely conclude that no CZC can be formed due to a message chain 2 MC which relies on a non-causal concatenation in I j;z . For example, the non-causal concatenation forming the message chain m 4 ; m 3 ] is out of the usable knowledge of P k . This chain gives rise to CZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; m 4 ; m 3 ]). Hence, a protocol in F NZC is obliged to direct a forced checkpoint before executing deliver( :last) if no information concerning the de nite delimitation of the checkpoint interval I j;z has been noti ed to P k by means of a causal message chain.
In conclusion, constraints imposed in Section 4.2 do not allow to prevent checkpoint and communication patterns less constrained than the SCZC pattern in order to do a safe removal of CZCs.
A Remark on Characterizations Stronger than NCZC
Imposing additional constraints on the structure of a CZC can lead to characterizations stronger than NCZC. As an example, let consider the subset X of CZC such that (i) the length of is minimal, (ii) is a member of a set of message chains that establish the rst Z-path between C k;y and C i;x (this set contains message chains sharing the last message), and (iii) is the chain with minimal length in that set 5 . The existence of any CZCs in the execution implies the existence of a Z-cycle in X, thus, if X is empty, then CZC is empty.
Although the latter characterization could be interesting from a theoretical point of view, from a practical one, it does not add information, suitable for protocols in F NZC , in order to reduce the number of forced checkpoints compared to the one provided by CZC. In other words, this characterization does not help to nd checkpoint and communication patterns more re ned than SCZC and detectable on-the-y. More speci cally, the information concerning the \time" in which the chain is established and the length of does not help as is, generally, non-causal and, thus, it cannot be tracked at the last opportunity time by a protocol as shown in the previous section. The information on the length of does not help to save forced checkpoints as the concept of prime is related to a set of causal message chains (see Section 4.1) which includes the one of minimal length, thus, preventing a non-causal concatenation (e.g. m) due to either any chain of the set min(M(C i;x ; P k )) or the one with minimal length has the same e ect in terms of forced checkpoints.
A Checkpointing Protocol in F NZC
The protocol presented in this section tracks on-the-y all the SCZC patterns, and breaks them by introducing forced checkpoints before delivering message :last (i.e., at last opportunity time). This is done by exploiting the control information piggybacked on application messages, that encodes the causal past of the execution with respect to the event of the delivery of a message, and the local history of a process (i.e., fully exploits the usable knowledge at that event). The protocol uses a vector clock and a matrix of integers as control information.
Tracking SCZC Patters
In order to track the formation of SCZC(I j;z ; C i;x ; ; I k;y ), upon the arrival of a message :last, process P k has to verify whether conditions for the existence of that checkpoint and communication pattern are satis ed. In the following paragraphs we introduce the data structures to accomplish this task.
Tracking 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k )). To detect if 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k )), a vector clock mechanism is used considering checkpoints of processes as relevant events of the execution 16]. Each process P k maintains a vector clock V C k whose size corresponds to the number of processes. V C k i] stores the maximum checkpoint rank of P i seen by P k and V C k k] stores the rank of the last checkpoint taken by P k . V C k is initialized to zero except the k-th entry which is initialized to one. Each application message m sent by P k piggybacks the current value of V C k (denoted m:V C). Following the updating rule of a vector clock, upon the delivery of a message m, V C k is updated from m:V C by taking a component-wise maximum. 5 In such a case we have a \temporal" and a \spatial" constraint both on and on .
A causal message chain including message m as :last is prime (i.e., belongs to some min(M(C i; ; P k )), if, upon the delivery of m by process P k , the following predicate holds ( 6 ) Each process P k maintains a vector of integers Imm Pred k of size n and a matrix of integers Pred k , of size n n. Imm Pred k `] represents the maximum rank of the checkpoint interval from which process P`sent a message m which has been delivered by P k in its current checkpoint interval I k;y?1 (in other words C`; Imm Pred `] is an immediate predecessor of checkpoint C k;y ). Each entry of this vector is set to -1 every time a checkpoint is taken by P k . Pred k i; j] represents, to the knowledge of P k , the maximum rank of the checkpoint interval from which process P j sent a message m which has been delivered by P i in a checkpoint interval I i;x?1 with x V C k i]. The matrix Pred k is initialized to -1, its content is piggybacked on each message m sent by P k (m:P red) and the rules to update its components are the following: The behavior of process P k is shown in Figure 13 (all the procedures and the message handler are executed in atomic fashion). We would like nally to remark that, from an operational point of view, the elements of the diagonal of the matrix Pred are never used by the protocol. Hence, when implementing the protocol, the vector clock V C can be embedded in that diagonal. Thus, the resulting control information piggybacked on application messages boils down to a matrix of n n integers. This means that, in the logical time (timestamp), communications can be seen as causal in each interval. That is, communication events can be reordered in any interval making all deliver events to precede all send events and timestamp does not decrease along any causal message chain. An example of this is shown in Figure 14 . In other words, an interval-based abstraction of a distributed execution satis es VP if, and only if, it is possible to associate a timestamping function within intervals with the following features: (F1) intervals which are connected by a message must be timestamped in a non-decreasing way In other words, VP constitutes a common basis for all checkpointing protocols ensuring NZC. We show, however, that protocols in F NZC can be split into two sub-families according to the way they \see" the previous equivalence between VP and NZC.
VP-Enforced Checkpointing Protocols
Let a timestamping function be assumed to timestamp checkpoint intervals consistently with F1 and F2. Then a checkpointing protocol in F NZC can be derived as follows. Timestamps are piggybacked on any application message. Upon the arrival of a message m at P i in the checkpoint interval I i;x , the communication-induced checkpoint protocol must push P i to take a forced checkpoint C i;x+1 before delivering m whenever ether F1 or F2 would be violated by that deliver event. The new created checkpoint interval I i;x+1 is then timestamped by the protocol according to the timestamping function.
We name any protocol designed starting by an a priori assumed timestamping function VPenforced protocol. Examples of such protocols are in 3, 10, 11, 20] . In what follows we discuss the Briatico et al. protocol 3] and a protocol based on vector times.
Briatico et al. Protocol 3] . In this protocol, an integer is assumed to timestamp checkpoint intervals. Thus, each process P k endows a variable (the timestamp) denoted ts k . The timestamp is updated by a process P k according to the following rules:
A Vector Time Based Protocol. Assume using a vector time 7, 16] to timestamp checkpoint intervals when considering those intervals as vector time relevant events. Each process P k , thus, endows a vector of integers TS k (the timestamp) where TS k i] represents the highest checkpoint inteval of process P i seen (directly or transitively) by process P k . The timestamps is updated by process P k according to the following rules:
1. when starting the execution, TS k is initialized to zero, but the k-th entry which is set to one; 2. when sending a message m, a copy of TS k is piggybacked on message m (denoted m:T S); 3 Finally, let us note that, in some sense, VP-enforced corresponds to that protocols' class that sees the relation of equivalence of Theorem 6.1 from left to right. i.e., rst ensuring VP. As a consequence NZC.
VP-Accordant Checkpointing Protocols
We name any protocol in F NZC which is designed without a priori assuming a timestamping function consistent with F1 and F2 VP-accordant protocol. It prevents the formation of a speci c checkpoint and communication pattern which, in turn, avoids the occurrence of Z-cycles, i.e., the predicate that triggers the action to take a forced checkpoint depends on the checkpoint and communication patterns that are going to be formed if a message would be delivered. Thus, if the predicate is evaluated to true, at least one \bad" checkpoint and communication pattern is going to be formed. Then the protocol takes a forced checkpoint to break that pattern.
As VP , NZC, also for a VP-accordant protocol there will exist a timestamping function that could be used to timestamp checkpoint intervals produced by the protocol consistently with F1 and F2. However such a function does not play any role in the design of the protocol. Example of VP-accordant protocols are in 1, 19, 21] . Some of them are discussed below. Russell's Protocol 19] . This protocol accepts only causal chains. It actually prevents the formation of hsend deliveri (i.e., m m 0 ) patterns in any checkpoint interval by means of forced checkpoints, so no non-causal concatenation of messages can ever occur, preventing the formation of Z-cycles. The resulting checkpoint and communication pattern of the execution satis es NZC, then, the protocol ensures VP and there will exist a timestamping function that allows to timestamp checkpoint intervals consistently with F1 and F2. This function was later shown by Wang in 21] . It uses a vector time considering checkpoints as relevant events.
FDAS Protocol 21] . FDAS avoids the formation of checkpoint and communication patterns with the following structure C i;x k;y m 0 with 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k )). As the previous pattern is part of the structure of a PZC, the prevention of all those patterns guarantees no prime Z-cycle and then the NZC property. FDAS attaches a vector of checkpoint ranks to each application message to check if that bad pattern is going to be formed. That vector can be used to timestamp checkpoint intervals consistently with F1 and F2.
BHMR Protocol 1]
This protocol prevents the formation of dependencies between two checkpoints due to non-causal message chains composed by two causal message chains (i.e., = k;y 0 ) if they are not doubled, in a visible way, by a causal message chain. In terms of concatenation relations, we get that a dependency due to a non-causal message chain = k;y 0 is doubled by a causal message chain 00 if the pair of checkpoints related by is also related by 00 (i.e., if C i;x C j;y then C i;x 00 C j;y ). The doubling is visible by P k (the only process able to break ) if there exists a causal message chain 000 such that 00 000 is prime (i.e., 00 000 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k ))).
It is easy to show that this protocol prevents the formation of any CZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; ). In particular there are two cases: = 0 i.e., is a causal message chain. CZC(C i;x ; ; I k;y ; 0 ) is a particular dependency between C i;x and itself that cannot be doubled, so it is prevented by taking a forced checkpoint before delivering :last; = 1 2 : : : `w ith`> 1 where each pair of successive causal message chains establishes a dependency between two distinct checkpoints that it is non-doubled. Note that, the composition of must exist, otherwise we fall in the previous case. Then the protocol prevents this pattern by taking`forced checkpoints.`? 1 forced checkpoints are taken to prevent each non-causal concatenation of two successive causal message chains composing . The last forced checkpoint is taken by P k to prevent the pattern k;y :first. BHMR protocol ensures NZC and then VP. It piggybacks a vector of checkpoint intervals and a matrix of booleans on each application message. The vector can be used to timestamp checkpoint intervals consistently with F1 and F2.
The protocol proposed in this paper is a VP-accordant one. It is based on the prevention of suspect core Z-cycle patterns. Thanks to this prevention it avoids the presence of CZCs and then the protocol ensures NZC by Theorem 4.5. As VP , NZC, also for the protocol proposed here there will exist a timestamping function that would ensure VP to the outcoming checkpoint and communication pattern.
6.3.1 A Remark on the Rollback-Dependency-Trackability Property VP-accordant checkpointing protocols discussed above have been designed to ensure the RollbackDependency-Trackability property (RDT ) 21]. This property stipulates that if there exists a Z-path between two checkpoints due to a non-causal message chain (i.e., C i;x C j;y ), then there must exist at least one causal message chain which establishes a Z-path between those checkpoints (i.e., C i;x C j;y ).
As the Z-cycle is a particular type of non-causal Z-path between a checkpoint and itself, each checkpoint and communication pattern that satis es RDT also guarantees NZC. The viceversa is not true. Intuitively, this implies that each practical problem solved by NZC can be solved also by RDT at the cost of additional overhead. RDT allows to design simple and decentralized solutions to practical problems that need to compute the minimum or the maximum global consistent checkpoint that include a given set of checkpoints, such as software error recovery and output commit. On the other hand, ensuring NZC is enough to compute a consistent global checkpoint that include a given checkpoint, which is su cient for solving important practical problems like domino-free rollback-recovery.
A Comparison among Checkpointing Protocols
An interesting observation is that, the protocol proposed in this paper is, to our knowledge, the rst VP-accordant protocol that ensures NZC but not RDT . This results generally in less overhead, in terms of forced checkpoints, shown by our protocol compared to other VP-accordant protocols as they ensure a stronger property. It follows trivially that the Russell's pattern, m m 0 , and the pattern prevented by FDAS (i.e., C i;x k;y m 0 with 2 min(M(C i;x ; P k ))) are parts of an SCZC.
When considering the same usable knowledge (i.e., the protocol decides to take a forced checkpoint based on the same past checkpoint and communication pattern), each time the proposed protocol takes a forced checkpoint, Russell's protocol takes a forced checkpoint and each time the proposed protocol takes a forced checkpoint, FDAS protocol takes a forced checkpoint. As far as BHMR protocol is concerned, we can do only a qualitative comparison. Figure 15 .a shows a checkpoint and communication pattern in which BHMR protocol takes a forced checkpoint while the proposed protocol does not take it. Whereas Figure 15 .b shows a scenario in which the proposed protocol takes a forced checkpoint while BHMR protocol does not take it. Note that the probability that checkpoint and communication patterns like the one proposed in Figure 15 .a occur is extremely higher than that of the pattern depicted in Figure 15 .b. Preliminary experimental results con rm that the average checkpointing overhead of BHMR protocol is much higher than that of the protocol proposed in this paper.
Concerning the performance of VP-enforced protocols, their checkpointing overhead strongly depends on the way the timestamp increases at each process which, in turn, rests on the strategy processes adopt for taking basic checkpoints. For example, if basic checkpoints are taken periodically (periodic checkpointing strategy) and the period is similar at distinct processes, this results in an implicit coordination among processes that ensures the NZC property by taking only a few forced checkpoints (timestamp increases in each process at the same speed). In the best case no forced checkpoint is taken. In the worst case, no correlation exists among the strategies for taking basic checkpoints at distinct processes (e.g., random checkpointing strategy), each basic checkpoint could direct n?1 forced checkpoints generating a very high overhead. The overhead of the protocol proposed in this paper loosely depends on the basic checkpointing strategy as it is a VP-accordant protocol. Such a strategy is de ned by the application (Section 5.1) according to its requirements. Preliminary experimental results show that our protocol is better than the Briatico et al. protocol in the general case in which there is no correlation between the basic checkpointing strategies in distinct processes. When the strategies are correlated Briatico et. al protocol takes less forced checkpoints than our protocol.
A Remark on a Previous Taxonomy
A common intuition separated in the past checkpointing protocols in F NZC into two families:
model-based and index-based. This intuition has been nally proposed as a taxonomy by Elnozahy, Johnson and Wang in 6]. The motivation about the separation was that "..model-based checkpointing maintains certain checkpoint and communication structure which is provably domino-free, and index-based coordination enforces the consistency between checkpoints with the same index ...". According to previous de nition, model-based based protocols include VP-accordant protocols while index-based encompasses protocols based on sequence numbers like Briatico et al. protocol 3] . Using the previous classi cation, protocols based on vector times (see Section 6.2) would be placed in the model-based family since they do not try actually to enforce consistency between checkpoints with the same vector time. However, vector time based protocols do not look for domino-free checkpoint and communication structures as we have shown in Section 6.2.
This problem comes from the fact that the above intuitive separation is not a sharp (and formal)
criterion. The equivalence between VP and NZC provides a sharp (and formal) separation thanks to the fact that VP sees all protocols deriving from the same source.
Summary
Since the Randell's work ( 18] ), the problem of building a checkpoint and communication pattern in which each checkpoint can be used in some consistent global checkpoint to avoid a domino e ect during a rollback phase has been extensively studied in the last two decades. That operational property corresponds formally to the fact that a checkpoint and communication pattern satis es the NZC (No-Z-Cycle) property. This paper provided a characterization of the NZC property. The characterization is based on a particular type of Z-cycle, namely \core Z-Cycle", that has to be absent from the checkpoint and communication pattern of a distributed execution in order to remove all Z-cycles. This result has been obtained thanks to the introduction of concatenation relations which allow to express, in easy way, the structure of checkpoint and communication patterns. Based on the characterization, we designed a checkpointing protocol that prevents the formation of suspect core Z-cycles whose structure represents the causal part of any core Z-cycle. The protocol lies on the following basic hypothesis: (i) the usable knowledge of the execution at a certain event can not be more than the one included in the causal past of that event, (ii) the execution is asynchronous.
Finally we proposed a taxonomy of communication-induced checkpointing protocols that satisfy constraints of Section 5.1. This taxonomy is based on the notion of VP (Virtual Precedence) property, introduced in 10], which, in the particular context of checkpointing, has been shown to be equivalent to the NZC property.
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